Malicious ZharkBot Execution via Explert Masquerade in Temp via process_creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-16
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the ZharkBot payload running as explert.exe from a Temp directory, a name chosen to mimic the legitimate Windows explorer process. Execution of an explorer look alike out of a user Temp folder is highly abnormal and reflects the loader staging its main module. The combined misspelled name and untrusted path make this a strong indicator of ZharkBot activity.

Related detections9 linkedT1036.005 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Fake Fortinet Patch Infostealer Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Masquerading Python Interpreter csshost Executing Script
FortiClient Binary Executed from LocalAppData Compliance Directory (via process_creation)
Masquerading Edge Update Masquerade Executed From AppData (via process_creation)
Suspicious CTFMON Masqueraded Binary Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious SSH Reverse Tunnel via Renamed plink Utility on Triofox Host
Suspicious TransferLoader Temporary File Creation in Windows Temp (via file_event)
LeakyStealer Persistence via EdgeUpdateCore Run Key Masquerade (via registry_set)
Suspicious Run Key Masquerading as GoogleUpdate From Wrong Path via Registry Set (via registry_set)
Malicious ZharkBot Execution via Explert Masquerade in Temp via process_creation
Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.