Malicious zqtxmo Batch Script Execution by Fighting Ursa

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the zqtxmo.bat batch script run by Fighting Ursa after a sideloaded DLL entry point, a stage that launches msedge with a base64 argument to reach its webhook based command and control. The named batch file is a distinctive artifact of this infection chain. Detecting it exposes the follow-on execution stage of the campaign.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious zqtxmo Batch Script Execution by Fighting Ursa

Pivot detection · T1059.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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