Masquerading Systemd Service Masquerade via Systemctl Reenable of rsyslogd (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects systemctl reenabling a service named rsyslogd, the persistence behavior of the Kimsuky Gomir variant that installs a malicious rsyslogd service to impersonate the legitimate rsyslog logging daemon. Adversaries leverage the trailing d suffix to blend with real system services while ensuring the implant restarts, making early detection critical for surfacing masqueraded persistence before further intrusion activity.

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Masquerading Systemd Service Masquerade via Systemctl Reenable of rsyslogd (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1543.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.