Network DNS Queries to IP-Embedding Wildcard DNS Services

Flags DNS queries to wildcard services that embed an IP in the subdomain (e.g., nip.io, sslip.io).

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
dns
Author
MahirAli Khan (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2026-11-05
Updated
2026-11-05

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule matches DNS queries whose names end with domains associated with IP-embedding wildcard DNS services. These services dynamically resolve subdomains that contain an encoded IP address, which can be abused to stand up infrastructure or communication endpoints without registering a custom domain. Detection relies on DNS query telemetry where the queried name suffix is available for pattern matching.

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Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.