PATCHCORD Beacon C2 Tasking via api.jsp clientId Poll (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-29
Updated
2026-08-29

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the PATCHCORD implant polling its command channel with the hardcoded Beacon user-agent and the api.jsp clientId tasking URI observed in the Afghan telecom intrusion set. Adversaries use this fixed user-agent and endpoint to fetch operator commands over HTTP. The distinctive agent string and URI make this beacon reliably separable from normal web traffic.

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PATCHCORD Beacon C2 Tasking via api.jsp clientId Poll (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.