Possible Access-Code Validation Beacon to Malware Delivery C2 (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to an /api/submit endpoint carrying a code parameter, the access-code validation call made by a DocuSign-themed loader before it retrieves its second stage in a Vidar delivery chain analyzed by Joe Sandbox. Adversaries gate payload delivery behind server-side code validation to evade sandboxes and analysts, so this submit-with-code request pattern surfaces the loader contacting its delivery infrastructure.

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Possible Access-Code Validation Beacon to Malware Delivery C2 (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1102 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.