Possible AppDomainManager Hijack via Application Config File (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1574.014AppDomainManager
Persistence
- T1574.014AppDomainManager
Priv Esc
- T1574.014AppDomainManager
Defense Evasion
- T1574.014AppDomainManager
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of an update.exe.config application configuration file used by Screening Serpens for AppDomainManager injection with ETW disabled. The malicious config forces the .NET runtime to load an attacker assembly and blinds Event Tracing for Windows.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange

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Possible AppDomainManager Hijack via Application Config File (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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