Possible Atera or Tactical RMM Agent Execution via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-15
Updated
2026-09-15

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the Atera or Tactical RMM agents, remote management tools MuddyWater abused in the DarkBeatC2 campaign for persistent operator access. Because these agents are also used by legitimate IT teams, unexpected installs on non-managed hosts should be validated.

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Possible AnyDesk RMM Silent MSI Installation via Windows Installer (via process_creation)
Suspicious Outbound Connection To MoonPeak C2 High Ports
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Possible Atera or Tactical RMM Agent Execution via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.