Possible AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account (via cloudtrail)
This rule detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
SigmalowCloudv1
sigma
possible-aws-route-53-domain-transferred-to-another-account-via-cloudtrail
title: Possible AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account (via cloudtrail)
id: 833af6ef-901f-5ca7-91e7-972dc70eb596
status: stable
description: This rule detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.toml
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-04-13
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: route53.amazonaws.com
eventName: TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: low
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.