Possible AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account (via cloudtrail)

This rule detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.

SigmalowCloudv1
sigma
title: Possible AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account (via cloudtrail)
id: 833af6ef-901f-5ca7-91e7-972dc70eb596
status: stable
description: This rule detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.toml
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-04-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: route53.amazonaws.com
        eventName: TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.