Possible AWS S3 Data Management Manipulation (via cloudtrail)
This rule detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services.
SigmalowCloudv1
sigma
possible-aws-s3-data-management-manipulation-via-cloudtrail
title: Possible AWS S3 Data Management Manipulation (via cloudtrail)
id: b1d506fb-2bc2-5723-87b6-6ee5c7c8a4e0
status: stable
description: This rule detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1145/files
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_Operations.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketLogging.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketWebsite.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketEncryption.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/setting-repl-config-perm-overview.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_RestoreObject.html
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-03-13
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1537
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: s3.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- PutBucketLogging
- PutBucketWebsite
- PutEncryptionConfiguration
- PutLifecycleConfiguration
- PutReplicationConfiguration
- ReplicateObject
- RestoreObject
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: low
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.