Possible Azure Storage Ransomware via Customer-Managed Key Encryption

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
activitylogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-14
Updated
2026-09-14

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects Azure Activity operations that rewrite storage account encryption to attacker-controlled key material, a hijack path for blob storage ransomware. Writing an encryption scope or setting the account key source to Key Vault lets an actor re-encrypt blobs under a key they hold and then deny the victim access. These control-plane encryption changes on production storage accounts warrant urgent review.

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Malicious The Gentlemen Ransomware Encryptor via Distinctive CLI Flags
Malicious GigaWiper Ransomware File Extension .candy
Malicious Forced BitLocker Encryption for Extortion (via process_creation)
Possible Azure Storage Ransomware via Customer-Managed Key Encryption
Pivot detection · T1486 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.