Possible DNS Query to External Service Interaction Domains (via dns)

This rule detects DNS queries to well-known out-of-band application security testing (OAST) and callback domains. These services (e.g. Burp Collaborator, interactsh, canarytokens, dnslog.cn) are used by security researchers and adversaries alike to confirm blind vulnerabilities such as SSRF, XXE, blind RCE, and Log4Shell-style injections, where the exploit payload triggers an external DNS lookup to a controlled domain. A detection suggests that a host on your network resolved one of these domains, which may mean: (1) an adversary is actively probing or exploiting a vulnerable service and using the callback to confirm code execution or data exfiltration, (2) a security scanner (e.g. Nuclei, Gobies) is running against internal targets. Investigate the source host, the full DNS query string (the unique subdomain prefix encodes the callback session), and any concurrent outbound connections or process behavior to determine intent.

SigmahighNetworkv1
Full detection rule

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Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.