Possible Dropbox API C2 Channel via Non-Browser DNS Query

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-02
Updated
2026-11-02

ATT&CK techniques

C2 → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries for the Dropbox API endpoints api.dropboxapi.com and content.dropboxapi.com made by a process that is not a browser or the Dropbox client. In the WithSecure C2 and Exfiltration Lab 3 a C3 channel abuses Dropbox as a legitimate web service for command and control and data exfiltration through sequential upload, download and delete calls. Attackers hide C2 inside trusted cloud storage traffic to blend with normal usage.

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Possible Dropbox API C2 Channel via Non-Browser DNS Query
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.