Possible Execution of DriverQuery.EXE (via process_creation)
This rule detects use of the "driverquery" utility. That can be leveraged to perform reconnaissance on installed drivers
SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
possible-execution-of-driverquery-exe-via-process-creation
title: Possible Execution of DriverQuery.EXE (via process_creation)
id: 1f1816f1-7278-5f98-bba0-b5eb770f5451
status: stable
description: This rule detects use of the "driverquery" utility. That can be leveraged to perform reconnaissance on installed drivers
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/
- https://www.vmray.com/cyber-security-blog/analyzing-ursnif-behavior-malware-sandbox/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/saigon-mysterious-ursnif-fork.html
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-01-04
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1652
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: 'driverquery.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'drvqry.exe'
filter_main_other:
- ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- ParentImage|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_driverquery_usage/info.yml
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.