Possible Godfather Android Banking Trojan C2 Endpoints

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-27
Updated
2026-09-27

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to the fafa.php sender_new.php and mp4_recorder.php endpoints which are the command and control and data collection URIs of the Godfather Android banking trojan. These paths deliver injection targets and receive stolen credentials, SMS and screen recordings. Detecting them on the network surfaces infected devices communicating with Godfather infrastructure.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange
SquidLoader C2 Beacon via Kubernetes-Themed URI and Legacy Trident User-Agent (via proxy)
Malicious Fake Converter Beacon Command-and-Control to confetly Endpoints (via proxy)
Malicious Matanbuchus C2 Beacon via Spoofed Skype User-Agent (via proxy)
IDAT Loader C2 Notification via sendNotification.php (via proxy)
EtherRAT C2 Beacon via Fixed GUID Query Parameter (via proxy)
Suspicious Kimsuky C2 Retrieval via list.php query Pattern (via proxy)
APT28 Roundcube XSS Beacon via zJ2w9x Telemetry Endpoint (via webserver)
Masquerading jQuery-Masquerading C2 Request with Spoofed Referrer via proxy (via proxy)
IDAT Loader Connectivity Check via Short racon User-Agent (via proxy)
Possible Godfather Android Banking Trojan C2 Endpoints
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.