Possible MOVEit Transfer SSRF via MOVEitISAPI action m2

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-08
Updated
2026-09-08

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects requests to MOVEitISAPI.dll with action=m2, the server-side request forwarding primitive identified through patch diffing by Assetnote for CVE-2023-34362. The m2 action proxies requests toward internal-only MOVEit endpoints and is a core step in reaching the vulnerable machine2 logic. Detecting this action on the ISAPI extension highlights probing or exploitation of the internal request path.

Related detections9 linkedT1190 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Data Exfiltration via curl with Stealer Specific BuildID Header
Suspicious Shadow File Exfiltration Over Dev TCP on Linux via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Netcat Reverse Shell via Named Pipe on Linux via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious Command Shell Spawned by SQL Server via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious Command Shell or PowerShell Spawned by Tomcat via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Shell Script Execution From Temp Directory on SonicWall SMA1000 Appliance (via process_creation)
Possible TP-Link Command Injection via WlanNetworkRpm Endpoint (via webserver)
Malicious SharePoint ToolPane Exploitation via SignOut Referer
Suspicious Tomcat Session Deserialization Trigger via Crafted JSESSIONID
Possible MOVEit Transfer SSRF via MOVEitISAPI action m2
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.