Possible Origin Logger C2 Exfiltration via Hardcoded User Agent and Gate Endpoints via proxy

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Origin Logger keylogger command and control traffic that beacons with a hardcoded Firefox/99.0 user agent to /gate and /login exfiltration endpoints. Origin Logger is an AgentTesla derived stealer that harvests browser credentials and web session data. Correlating the fixed user agent with the exfil URI paths surfaces credential theft egress while suppressing benign Firefox browsing.

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Possible Origin Logger C2 Exfiltration via Hardcoded User Agent and Gate Endpoints via proxy
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.