Possible PetitPotam Coercion via IPC$ Named Pipe Access (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-17
Updated
2026-10-17

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects network share access in Event ID 5145 to the IPC$ share targeting sensitive RPC named pipes such as efsrpc and lsarpc used to coerce authentication. PetitPotam abuses the EFS RPC interface to force a host to authenticate to an attacker for NTLM relay. Coerced authentication relayed to ADCS or other services enables privilege escalation and domain takeover.

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Pivot detection · T1187 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.