Possible Ransomware Pre-Encryption VM Termination via esxcli

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-09
Updated
2026-09-09

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects use of esxcli to force kill running virtual machines, a step ransomware performs on ESXi hosts to unlock VM disk files before encryption. Multiple studied families run vm process kill with type force to stop guests prior to mass encryption. Detecting it can interrupt the attack before data is locked.

Related detections9 linkedT1489 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Lynx Ransomware Encryptor Execution via Distinctive CLI Flags (via process_creation)
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Possible Akira Ransomware VM Shutdown via vim-cmd
Malicious Massive Processes Termination Burst (via process_creation)
Malicious Service Deactivation - Command (via process_creation)
Malicious ESXi Virtual Machine Termination and Snapshot Removal
Malicious Stopping of Security or Backup Services Before Impact (via process_creation)
Malicious Massive Services Deletion Burst (via process_creation)
Possible Ransomware Pre-Encryption VM Termination via esxcli
Pivot detection · T1489 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.