Possible SMB Share C2 Beacon via Lock File Polling

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-03
Updated
2026-11-03

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects repeated access to lock extension files on a network share which matches the C3 UNC file share command and control channel described in the WithSecure lab where randomized lock files were written and polled on a roughly ten second interval. Command and control routed over an internal SMB share evades outbound network controls so lock file access patterns on shares are worth surfacing for triage.

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Possible SMB Share C2 Beacon via Lock File Polling
Pivot detection · T1071 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.