Possible Stolen AWS Credential Validation via STS GetCallerIdentity

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-13
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects AWS STS GetCallerIdentity calls which the Hugging Face breach actor issued to validate stolen cloud credentials after harvesting secrets from a compromised AI agent environment. Identity self-checks are a common first move once keys are obtained. Because legitimate automation also calls this API, baseline expected principals and alert on unfamiliar or first-seen callers.

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Possible Stolen AWS Credential Validation via STS GetCallerIdentity
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.