Possible Targeted Kerberoasting via servicePrincipalName Modification

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-07
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects addition of a servicePrincipalName value to a user account object. Adversaries with write access set an SPN on a target account to make it kerberoastable, then request a service ticket to crack the account password offline.

Related detections9 linkedT1558.003 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Kerberos Ticket File Creation Indicating Credential Theft (via file_event)
Suspicious Kerberoasting via setspn Service Principal Query
Masquerading Kerberos Ticket Abuse via Rubeus (via process_creation)
Suspicious SQL Service Principal Name Enumeration via Setspn
Windows: Suspicious Kerberos Ticket Requests from PowerShell Using KerberosRequestorSecurityToken
Windows Process Creation: RemoteKrbRelay Kerberos Relay Tool Execution
Windows Kerberos KDC Key Distribution Failure: No Suitable Encryption Key or Unsupported EType
Rubeus HackTool Execution via PowerShell ScriptBlock Flags (Windows)
Windows Process Creation: KrbRelay.exe Kerberos Relay Tool Execution
Possible Targeted Kerberoasting via servicePrincipalName Modification
Pivot detection · T1558.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.