Windows Process Activity Indicative of QBot (WinRAR to wscript, ping/type, regsvr32)

Alerts on Windows process creation consistent with QBot-like script execution chains from WinRAR and regsvr32/tmp staging.

FreeReviewedSigma · Critical · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-10-01
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.005Visual Basic
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation patterns associated with QBot activity by matching specific parent/child process execution chains and distinctive command-line fragments. Attackers commonly use scripting and living-off-the-land utilities to stage payloads, execute commands, and prepare components on disk. Telemetry relied on includes process creation events with parent image, child image, and command-line arguments.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Activity Indicative of QBot (WinRAR to wscript, ping/type, regsvr32)

Pivot detection · T1059.005 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

potential-qbot-execution-on-windows-via-wscript-winrar-parent-ping-type-and-regs-4fcac6eb

title: Windows Process Activity Indicative of QBot (WinRAR to wscript, ping/type, regsvr32)
id: 3c30d5da-f448-4cd9-a9fd-8c1e0bf0b3a7
status: stable
description: This rule flags Windows process creation patterns associated with QBot activity by matching specific parent/child process execution chains and distinctive command-line fragments. Attackers commonly use scripting and living-off-the-land utilities to stage payloads, execute commands, and prepare components on disk. Telemetry relied on includes process creation events with parent image, child image, and command-line arguments.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/killamjr/status/1179034907932315648
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/2e0647b7-eb86-4f72-904b-d2d0ecac07d1/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2019/Malware/QBot/proc_creation_win_malware_qbot.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-10-01
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.005
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection1:
    ParentImage|endswith: \WinRAR.exe
    Image|endswith: \wscript.exe
  selection2:
    CommandLine|contains: " /c ping.exe -n 6 127.0.0.1 & type "
  selection3:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - regsvr32.exe
      - C:\ProgramData
      - .tmp
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 4fcac6eb-0287-4090-8eea-2602e4c20040
    type: derived

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