PowerShell Compress-Archive Temp Staging
Flags PowerShell scripts compressing data with Compress-Archive into $env:TEMP or Temp folders.
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powershell-compress-archive-temp-staging-b7a3c9a3
title: PowerShell Compress-Archive Temp Staging
id: 8e184057-9c55-4cdc-b893-63d65e2dccf8
related:
- id: 71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412
type: similar
- id: daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb
type: similar
- id: 85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98
type: similar
- id: b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies PowerShell script block text that uses Compress-Archive to compress files or folders with the output directed into common temporary locations such as $env:TEMP, AppData\Local\Temp, or Windows\Temp. Attackers may compress collected data to make it easier to package and exfiltrate while reducing transfer size. It relies on PowerShell script block logging telemetry to match specific Compress-Archive command patterns and destination paths.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_zip_compress.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-07-20
modified: 2023-12-18
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1074.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: "Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath $env:TEMP
- Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*\AppData\Local\Temp\
- Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*:\Windows\Temp\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule identifies PowerShell script block text that uses Compress-Archive to compress files or folders with the output directed into common temporary locations such as $env:TEMP, AppData\Local\Temp, or Windows\Temp. Attackers may compress collected data to make it easier to package and exfiltrate while reducing transfer size. It relies on PowerShell script block logging telemetry to match specific Compress-Archive command patterns and destination paths.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.