Windows PowerShell Modifies dMSA msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink Attributes

Flags PowerShell script content modifying msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink (dMSA link attributes) via AD link changes.

FreeReviewedSigma · Low · v2

Product: windows
Category: ps_script
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2025-05-24
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags PowerShell script text that modifies dMSA link attributes by targeting msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink. Attackers may abuse directory link attributes to establish or alter relationships that can support privilege escalation or persistence. It relies on PowerShell ScriptBlockText telemetry to match specific string fragments indicating the targeted attribute and distinguished name components.

Reporting behind it

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Windows PowerShell Modifies dMSA msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink Attributes

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

powershell-modify-dmsa-link-attribute-msds-managedaccountprecededbylink-in-ad-9b111d8e

title: Windows PowerShell Modifies dMSA msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink Attributes
id: 3c4dbe53-1130-4c7c-a3ed-bae6b11f500c
related:
  - id: 6c9eb492-e477-4df9-b0f4-571fc9db29cd
    type: similar
  - id: 9b111d8e-92e0-4153-88bc-daefc1333aba
    type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags PowerShell script text that modifies dMSA link attributes by targeting msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink. Attackers may abuse directory link attributes to establish or alter relationships that can support privilege escalation or persistence. It relies on PowerShell ScriptBlockText telemetry to match specific string fragments indicating the targeted attribute and distinguished name components.
references:
  - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_modification_of_dmsa_link_attribute.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-05-24
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078.002
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  category: ps_script
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - .Put("msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink
      - CN=
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative tasks modifying these attributes.
level: low
license: DRL-1.1

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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