Renamed Account Renamed to Admin (or Likely) Account to Evade Defense (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-07
Updated
2026-11-07

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rename a non admin account in order to evade SOC & operations vigilance.

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AWS CloudTrail: Instance Profile Role Assumed Actions Outside SSM RegisterManagedInstance
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Renamed Account Renamed to Admin (or Likely) Account to Evade Defense (via security)
Pivot detection · T1078.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.