Restic Backup Tool Exfiltration to Cloud Object Storage

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-28
Updated
2026-09-28

ATT&CK techniques

Collection → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. C2

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the restic backup utility or its environment variables being used together with a cloud object storage endpoint such as Backblaze B2 or Wasabi. Huntress observed operators abusing restic, sometimes renamed to dns.exe, to back up and exfiltrate victim data to attacker-controlled buckets. Pairing backup tooling with third-party object storage destinations indicates data theft rather than sanctioned backup.

Related detections9 linkedT1567.002 — drag to rearrange
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Data Exfiltration via AWS CLI
Malicious Cloud Credential Enumeration Piped to Network Exfiltration (via process_creation)
Possible Dropbox API C2 Channel via Non-Browser DNS Query
Suspicious Data Exfiltration to Wasabi Cloud via rclone (via process_creation)
Suspicious Data Exfiltration via rclone Cloud Transfer (via process_creation)
Malicious Data Exfiltration to MEGA and FTP via rclone Multi-Threaded Copy (via process_creation)
Malicious Data Exfiltration to MEGA via Rclone
Suspicious Data Exfiltration via Blat SMTP Client (via process_creation)
Restic Backup Tool Exfiltration to Cloud Object Storage
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.