RunningRAT Service Persistence via svchost NETSYSDDL Group (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-14
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects svchost.exe launched with the NETSYSDDL service group used by RunningRAT to load its malicious DLL under a masqueraded service. Adversaries leverage the svchost hosting model so the RAT executes as a service and survives reboots while blending into legitimate host processes.

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RunningRAT Service Persistence via svchost NETSYSDDL Group (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.