Scheduled Task Masquerading as Microsoft Wininet Config

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Persistence
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Priv Esc
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Defense Evasion
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects schtasks.exe creating a task under a Microsoft Windows Wininet Config path, a non-existent Microsoft task tree used by DeadRinger actors to disguise persistence. Placing tasks in a fake Microsoft folder helps them blend with legitimate scheduled tasks.

Reporting behind it

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Scheduled Task Masquerading as Microsoft Wininet Config

Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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