SocGholish Fake Browser Update Script Execution (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-03
Updated
2026-09-03

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Windows Script Host running a JavaScript file whose name impersonates a browser update, the delivery-and-execution behavior behind SocGholish drive-by fake-update lures. SocGholish is a prevalent initial-access threat profiled in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report that uses malicious JScript to stage follow-on payloads. Detecting the fake-update script surfaces the intrusion at the execution stage before hands-on-keyboard activity.

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SocGholish Fake Browser Update Script Execution (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.