StealC Persistence via LNK Dropped to Startup Folder by Non-Shell Process (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a shortcut in the user Startup folder by a process other than the Windows shell or Office click-to-run, the persistence behavior used by the StealC V2 Blender campaign to auto-run its LNK payloads at logon. Adversaries leverage Startup-folder shortcuts for simple logon persistence, making early detection critical for surfacing the foothold before the stealer runs on every session.

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Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.