Suspicious Active Directory Web Services Query from Localhost via SOAPHound

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Directory Service event 1644 activity attributed to a client connecting from the IPv6 loopback address over the Active Directory Web Services path, the local ADWS proxying behavior SOAPHound uses to relay LDAP through port 9389. Running the collector on a domain controller and querying ADWS via localhost obscures the true source of enumeration. A loopback ADWS client issuing bulk directory queries is anomalous and suggests on-host reconnaissance tooling.

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Suspicious Active Directory Web Services Query from Localhost via SOAPHound
Pivot detection · T1087.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.