Suspicious AddInProcess32 Outbound Connection after Process Hollowing

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055.012Process Hollowing
Defense Evasion
- T1055.012Process Hollowing
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1071.001Web Protocols
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the dotnet AddInProcess32 utility initiating outbound network connections which is highly unusual. Ande Loader hollowed 0bj3ctivity Stealer into AddInProcess32 so its C2 and exfiltration traffic run under a signed process. External connections from this rarely used binary indicate injected stealer activity.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious AddInProcess32 Outbound Connection after Process Hollowing

Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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