Suspicious Ahnenblatt Application Execution From User-Writable Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the legitimate Ahnenblatt genealogy application Ahnenblatt4.exe running from a Temp or AppData directory. In the RenEngine campaign this signed application was abused as a DLL side-loading host by dropping it next to malicious borlndmm.dll and cc32290mt.dll to launch HijackLoader as reported by Kaspersky. Execution of this uncommon application from a user-writable path signals a DLL search-order hijack rather than normal use.

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Suspicious Ahnenblatt Application Execution From User-Writable Directory
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.