Suspicious Anti-Recovery Zeroing via fsutil setZeroData (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-20
Updated
2026-10-20

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects use of fsutil setZeroData, which overwrites file regions with zeros to prevent forensic recovery, a self-delete and anti-recovery step in the 01flip Rust ransomware Windows chain. The technique destroys the original binary and data remnants after encryption to inhibit recovery and analysis.

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Suspicious Anti-Recovery Zeroing via fsutil setZeroData (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.