Suspicious AnyDesk Execution from Temporary or System Directory (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-03
Updated
2026-10-03

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the AnyDesk binary executing from a temporary, ProgramData or System32 directory rather than a normal installation path. Adversaries drop portable AnyDesk into staging directories to gain remote access without a full install, so execution from these locations is a strong sign of RMM abuse rather than sanctioned use.

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Suspicious Velociraptor DFIR Agent Deployed as Service
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Suspicious AnyDesk Remote Access Tool Executed from ProgramData
Suspicious AnyDesk Execution from Temporary or System Directory (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.