Suspicious AppInit_DLLs Registry Modification for DLL Injection

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1546.010AppInit DLLs
Priv Esc
- T1055.001Dynamic-link Library Injection
- T1546.010AppInit DLLs
Defense Evasion
- T1055.001Dynamic-link Library Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects modification of the AppInit_DLLs registry value, which forces the listed DLLs to load into every process that links user32.dll. Adversaries set this value to achieve system-wide DLL injection and persistence, as surveyed in Elastic's review of common process injection techniques.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1055.001 — drag to rearrange

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Windows Process Execution and DLL Injection via Tracker.exe

Windows TAIDOOR RAT DLL Load via rundll32 Command Line

Windows renamed dctask64.exe execution via known IMPHASH values

Suspicious AppInit_DLLs Registry Modification for DLL Injection

Pivot detection · T1055.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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