Suspicious APT Or YUM Package Manager Hook Configuration Created

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1546Event Triggered Execution
Priv Esc
- T1546Event Triggered Execution
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of configuration files in the APT or YUM package manager hook directories which adversaries abuse to execute arbitrary commands whenever the package manager runs. Planting a hook under apt.conf.d or the yum plugin configuration grants stealthy privileged persistence tied to routine system maintenance.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1546 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious APT Or YUM Package Manager Hook Configuration Created

Pivot detection · T1546 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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