Suspicious APT29 Zulip C2 Communication via curl User-Agent (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-16
Updated
2026-09-16

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects requests to the Zulip chat messages API using a curl User-Agent, the abuse of a legitimate collaboration service for command-and-control in the APT29 German Embassy campaign. The actor posted to the api v1 messages endpoint via curl to blend with normal SaaS traffic. Because Zulip is legitimate, the curl agent and messages path together narrow the match.

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Suspicious APT29 Zulip C2 Communication via curl User-Agent (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.