Suspicious Atera Agent Silent Onboarding via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-24
Updated
2026-10-24

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the AteraAgent remote monitoring binary launched with init-settings and an embedded integrator or company key, a command line used to silently onboard a host into an attacker-controlled Atera tenant. Adversaries abuse legitimate RMM agents like Atera for persistent remote access and command execution, so unattended agent onboarding outside sanctioned IT deployment is a meaningful signal.

Related detections9 linkedT1219 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Silent AteraAgent RMM Installation via IntegratorLogin
Possible Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Abuse for Remote Access
Suspicious NetSupport Manager Client Executing From ProgramData via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious PowerShell Download Cradle Spawned by Quick Assist
Suspicious AnyDesk Unattended Password Set via Piped Echo
Suspicious Remote Monitoring Tool Executing from GoAnywhere Directory
Suspicious NetSupport Manager Remote Client Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Atera Agent Silent Onboarding via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.