Suspicious AWS Console Login Profile Creation for Persistence (via cloudtrail)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation or update of an AWS IAM login profile which attaches console password access to an IAM user. As covered in the cloud persistence IR guide, threat actors add a login profile to a programmatic user to gain durable interactive access. Adding console credentials to an otherwise service user is a common cloud persistence step.

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Suspicious AWS Console Login Profile Creation for Persistence (via cloudtrail)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.