Suspicious AWS Organizations and Account Discovery via aws (via cloudtrail)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-06
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects AWS Organizations and account enumeration API calls that map the blast radius of compromised access keys. Unit 42 observed this cloud service discovery during the SugarCRM incident where stolen credentials were used to survey the target environment before resource abuse, so alerting is warranted when these calls come from unexpected principals.

Related detections6 linkedT1526 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Azure CLI Enumeration of Roles and Logic Apps
Suspicious Anonymous Access to Kubernetes API Server via Audit Log
Malicious Directory Enumeration With Recon Tooling User Agent via Azure AD Graph
GitHub Audit Log: Self-Hosted Runner Configuration Changes
Azure sign-in logs: Detect AzureHound discovery tool via default User-Agent
Windows Process Creation: Seatbelt.exe PUA Discovery Command-Line Execution
Suspicious AWS Organizations and Account Discovery via aws (via cloudtrail)
Pivot detection · T1526 · 6 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.