Suspicious AWS SAML Identity Provider Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-10
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a SAML identity provider through the IAM CreateSAMLProvider call. Adversaries register a rogue federation provider to establish durable authenticated access to the account, a persistence and account manipulation technique highlighted by Sekoia AWS detection guidance.

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Suspicious AWS SAML Identity Provider Creation
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.