Suspicious AWS STS Role Chaining From Temporary Session Credentials (via cloudtrail)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an AWS STS AssumeRole call whose caller is already an assumed-role session, the role chaining pattern attackers use to mint successive ASIA temporary credentials and persist beyond a single session expiry. Chained AssumeRole invocations extend stolen access and evade credential lifetime controls. Detecting assumed-role principals assuming further roles surfaces this persistence technique.

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Suspicious AWS STS Role Chaining From Temporary Session Credentials (via cloudtrail)
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.