Suspicious AWS Transfer Family Server Creation for Data Exfiltration (via cloudtrail)

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
- T1537Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of AWS Transfer Family servers or users, a capability Muddled Libra provisions to move stolen data out of a compromised account over managed file transfer. Standing up transfer infrastructure is uncommon and, when it follows credential access, indicates an adversary staging exfiltration to an external or attacker controlled destination.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1537 — drag to rearrange

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AWS CloudTrail S3 Bucket/Replication Configuration Tampering via Management API Calls

Suspicious AWS Transfer Family Server Creation for Data Exfiltration (via cloudtrail)

Pivot detection · T1537 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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