Suspicious Azure CLI Service Principal Login with Inline Secret

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-03
Updated
2026-11-03

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an Azure CLI service principal login where the client secret is supplied on the command line. It maps to abuse of stolen application credentials to authenticate non-interactively into a cloud tenant. Detecting it can reveal use of leaked service principal secrets for cloud access.

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Malicious AWS Cross-Account AssumeRole With Suspicious Session Names via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious Azure CLI Service Principal Login with Inline Secret
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.