Suspicious Azure OpenAI Training File Upload via Files Import Operation (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
activitylogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-01
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Azure OpenAI Files_Import and Files_Upload operations in diagnostic logs, the behavior Red Canary linked to model poisoning and data staging where an actor uploads fine-tuning files to an OpenAI resource. Unexpected file uploads to an Azure OpenAI deployment can indicate poisoning of training data or staging for later exfiltration.

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Suspicious Azure OpenAI Training File Upload via Files Import Operation (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.