Suspicious Azure Tenant Root Elevation via elevateAccess

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
activitylogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-13
Updated
2026-10-13

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Microsoft.Authorization elevateAccess action that grants a Global Administrator root access over all Azure subscriptions. Microsoft observed Storm-0501 abusing this to seize control of the cloud estate before ransomware impact. Tenant-wide elevation is a rare, high-privilege operation, so this action should be verified against expected administrative change.

Related detections6 linkedT1098.005 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious AWS Virtual MFA Device Creation
Suspicious Device Registration Following OAuth Token Theft
Suspicious Workday Payment Election Change via Compromised Account (via workday)
Possible Rogue Device Registration in Entra ID After Device Code Phishing
Suspicious Exchange Online Mail Flow Rule or Connector Creation via Compromised Account
Suspicious Azure Tenant Root Elevation via elevateAccess
Pivot detection · T1098.005 · 6 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.