Suspicious BadIIS Service Persistence Masquerading as System Services

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of Windows services under the BadIIS masquerading names Winlogin, FaxService or AudiosService, which imitate legitimate system service names through subtle misspellings. The commodity BadIIS ecosystem installs services under these deceptive names to persist and blend into service inventories. Creation of a service with these typo-squatted names indicates BadIIS persistence.

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Suspicious BadIIS Service Persistence Masquerading as System Services
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.