Suspicious Base64 Decode Piped to Python Interpreter for In-Memory Execution (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-12
Updated
2026-10-12

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a shell command that decodes Base64 content and pipes it directly into a Python interpreter, often alongside an LD_LIBRARY_PATH override. During Ivanti Connect Secure exploitation the actor executed obfuscated Python payloads this way to run tooling without touching disk. Chaining base64 decoding into python is a common obfuscated in-memory execution pattern on Linux appliances.

Related detections9 linkedT1027 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Thumbs.ini File Written to AppData by UNC2970 MISTPEN (via file_event)
Suspicious NSIS Self-Extractor Renaming Payload to CMD for Execution by Angry Likho
Obfuscated PowerShell Script: Indirect Cmdlet Execution via ExportedCommands Array Index
Suspicious Masqueraded DAT File Loader Chain in Loader Stage (via process_creation)
Malicious 3CX Second-Stage C2 Icon Retrieval from GitHub IconStorages (via dns_query)
Suspicious Command Execution via ComSpec Environment Variable Obfuscation
Suspicious PowerShell String Concatenation Obfuscation for Batch Extension via LNK (via process_creation)
Suspicious PIF Payload Assembly via copy /b Binary Concatenation
Suspicious PowerShell Spawned from PyInstaller MEI Extraction Folder (via process_creation)
Suspicious Base64 Decode Piped to Python Interpreter for In-Memory Execution (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1027 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.